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Are prices less sticky when markets are more competitive? Our
intuition would naturally lead us to give an aﬃrmative answer to that
question. But we ﬁrst show that DSGE models with staggered price
or wage contracts have actually the opposite and paradoxical prop-
erty, namely that price stickiness is an increasing function of compet-
itiveness. To eliminate this paradox, we next study a model where
monopolistic competitors choose prices optimally subject to a cost of
changing prices as in Rotemberg (1982a,b). For a given cost function,
we ﬁnd the more intuitive result that more competitiveness leads to
more ﬂexible prices.
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Is there a connection between competitiveness, market power and the “stick-
iness” of prices1? T h i si sa no l dq u e s t i o na n d ,a se a r l ya s1 9 3 5 ,G a r d i n e r
Means noted that, in the face of the general slump, prices were falling less in
sectors with high market power.
Recently price or wage rigidities have been successfully introduced into
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models2. The corresponding
models succeed in reproducing the persistent response of output and inﬂation
found in the data. Modelling nominal rigidities has notably taken the form
of staggered wage or price contracts à la Taylor (1979, 1980) or Calvo (1983).
It is possible to answer in such a framework our question on competi-
tiveness, since these models include a parameter which explicitly depicts the
degree of competitiveness, more speciﬁcally the elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods. But the answer to our question is highly paradoxical since, as
we shall see below, in models with staggered price contracts, one ﬁnds that
more competitiveness leads to more sticky prices.
The intuition is easy to grasp if one goes to the extreme case of perfectly
substitutable goods, corresponding to a competitive market. Consider to
simplify a Taylor model with two periods contracts. In any period t half
of the agents renew their contract. Because of perfect substitutability these
agents will have to align their price on the lowest price set in t−1 (which still
holds, since the contracts last 2 periods). And for the same reason so will
agents in period t+1.B yt h a tt i m ea l lp r i c e sw i l lb et h es a m ea n d ,c o n t i n u i n g
the same reasoning, all future prices will be equal to that price also, so that
prices are totally sticky irrespective of the shocks to which the economy may
be subjected. So full competitiveness leads to complete stickiness of prices
in that model.
Clearly this result is quite counterintuitive and our intuition would rather
lead us to believe that more competitive markets should lead to more ﬂexible,
less sticky, prices.
So in a second step we want to construct a model where more competi-
tiveness leads to more ﬂexible prices. For that we shall use a diﬀerent model
1By more sticky prices we will mean prices that return more slowly to their market
clearing value. In what follows prices will have an autoregressive root, denoted below as
φ, and stickiness will be measured by the size of that root.
2See for example Ascari (2000), Ascari and Rankin (2002), Bénassy (2002, 2003a,b),
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Collard
and Ertz (2000), Hairault and Portier (1993), Huang and Liu (2002), Jeanne (1998), Kim








































1of price stickiness proposed by Rotemberg (1982a,b), where prices are sticky
because there is a cost of changing prices, measured by an explicit convex
cost function. We shall show that, for a given cost function, the “ﬂexibility”
of prices increases with competitiveness.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 The agents

















a n da r es u b m i t t e di ne a c hp e r i o dt oab u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t :
PtCt + Mt = WtLt + Πt + µtMt−1 (2)
where µt is a multiplicative money shock à la Lucas (1972) and Πt is dis-
tributed proﬁts.
Output is produced with intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1] by com-









0 <θ≤ 1 (3)
where Yt is the level of output and Yjt the amount of intermediate good j used
in production. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is
equal to 1/(1 − θ), so the parameter θ is a good index of competitiveness.












Intermediate goods themselves are produced by monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1].F i r mj has a production function:
Yjt = ZtL
α
jt 0 <α≤ 1 (5)









































We shall consider in this article two alternative models of price rigidities:
-I nt h eﬁrst model we shall consider, prices are set according to Calvo
(1983) contracts. The probability of a price contract to continue unchanged
is γ. Conversely every contract can break with probability 1 − γ.I fac o n -
tract breaks in ﬁrm j at time t,t h i sﬁrm sets a new price Xjt, based on all
information available up to time t.
- In the second model we shall consider, as in Rotemberg (1982a,b), a ﬁrm
producing intermediate product j incurs, in addition to production costs, a











3 Common equilibrium conditions
We shall thus study two models, and begin by deriving in this section the
ﬁrst order and equilibrium conditions that are common to these two models.
3.1 Households
Households maximize the discounted utility (1) subject to the budget con-















+ ζt (WtLt + µtMt−1 − PtCt − Mt)
¸
(7)





























































1Now combining (8) and (10) and using µt+1 = Mt+1/Mt, we obtain:
Mt
PtCt














Output producing ﬁrms competitively maximize proﬁts (eq. 4) subject to








The elasticity of these demand curves goes from 1 to inﬁnity (in absolute
value) when θ goes from zero to one, so again θ appears as a natural index
of competitiveness.










4 Price dynamics under Calvo contracts
We shall now show that under Calvo contracts persistence is, quite counter-
intuitively, positively related to competitiveness.
4.1 Optimal price setting
We shall ﬁrst derive optimal price setting by intermediate ﬁrms under Calvo
price contracts. Consider a ﬁrm j which has to decide in period t its “new
price” Xjt. If that contract is still in eﬀect in period s ≥ t (with probability
























































1Firm j maximizes expected discounted real proﬁts, multiplied by the
marginal utility of consumption. Since utility (1) is logarithmic in consump-
tion, this marginal utility is equal to 1/Cs =1 /Ys.S oﬁrm j maximizes the
expected value of the following criterion, where the term γs−t represents the
























Now inserting (5) and (14) (with Pjs = Xjt, since we are dealing with the


















































We see that Xjt is actually independent of j.A l l ﬁrms changing their
price choose the same price, given by (19), which we shall denote as Xt.W e
ﬁnally use Cs = Ys and replace in (19) Ws by the value given by formula (11)

























































































We have from (13) yt = ct = mt − pt,s ot h a t( 2 1 )i sr e w r i t t e n :





s−tEt [(1 − δ)(ms − zs)+δps] (22)
with:
δ =
1 − αθ − ν + θν
1 − αθ
=1−
ν (1 − θ)
1 − αθ
(23)
Note that δ =1when θ =1 , i.e. when we are in the competitive case. If




ν (1 − α)
(1 − αθ)
2 > 0 (24)
Let us now turn to aggregate prices, which are given by eq. (15) above.
In view of the “demographics” of price contracts, a fraction (1 − γ)γi of price












which yields after loglinearization:









The dynamic system consists of Eqs. (22) and (26) above. Let us forward
(22) one period and take the expectation as of period t:





s−t−1Et [(1 − δ)(ms − zs)+δps] (27)
Combining with (22) we obtain:








































1Now (26) can be written:
pt − γpt−1 =( 1− γ)xt (29)
Forwarding one period and taking the expectation as of t yields:
Etpt+1 − γpt =( 1− γ)Etxt+1 (30)
L e tu si n s e r ti n t o( 2 8 )t h ev a l u e so fxt and Etxt+1 given by eqs. (29) and
(30). We obtain:
(1 − δ)(1− γ)(1− βγ)(pt − mt + zt)+γ (pt − pt−1)+βγ(pt − Etpt+1)=0
(31)
This equation is of the form:
a(pt − mt + zt)+b(pt − pt−1)+c(pt − Etpt+1)=0 (32)
with:
a =( 1− δ)(1− γ)(1− βγ) b = γc = βγ (33)
This solves as (see the appendix):
pt = φpt−1 +
∞ X
j=0




a + b + c(1 − φ)
κj =
c
a + b + c(1 − φ)
κj−1 (35)
and the autoregressive root φ is solution of the characteristic equation:
Φ(φ)=cφ
2 − (a + b + c)φ + b =0 (36)
4.4 Competitiveness and price stickiness
We shall study how the response of prices to monetary and technology shocks
depends on competitiveness. Let us deﬁne the composite shock ωt:
ωt = mt − zt (37)
Now let us ﬁrst consider as our “benchmark” the case where all prices are








































1pt = mt − zt = ωt (38)
We shall now consider the case γ 6=0 ,a n ds e et h a tt h ep a r a m e t e rφ in
eq. (34) will appear as a natural measure of the dynamic price stickiness. To
make things particularly clear, let us take the following simple process for
ωt:
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (39)
where the εt are i.i.d. Then it is shown in the appendix that eqs. (34) and
(35) simplify to (eq. 81):




We see that, following a shock, the discrepancy between the price and its
benchmark market clearing value ωt is both higher on impact, and returns
more slowly to zero when φ is high. So the parameter φ appears indeed as a
natural parameter to characterize price stickiness.
We can also compute the expression of output. Using yt = mt − pt,e q .
(40) yields:




We want to see ﬁnally how the index of price stickiness φ relates to the
index of competitiveness θ. Combining (33) and (36) we obtain the charac-
teristic equation giving φ:
Φ(φ)=βγφ
2 − [(1 − δ)(1− γ)(1− βγ)+γ + βγ]φ + γ =0 (42)
We can compute:
Φ(0) = γ ≥ 0 Φ(1) = −(1 − δ)(1− γ)(1− βγ) ≤ 0 (43)
S ot h e r ei sar o o tφ between 0 and 1.L e tu sn o wﬁnd out how this index
of price stickiness φ relates to the index of competitiveness θ.D i ﬀerentiate








2¢ > 0 (44)
















































We therefore have the paradoxical relation between competitiveness and
price stickiness.
5 Price dynamics under costs of changing prices
We shall now show that if price sluggishness is due to a convex cost of chang-
ing prices as in Rotemberg (1982a,b), then one ﬁnds the natural result that
price stickiness is negatively related to competitiveness.
5.1 Optimal price setting




























Firm j maximizes discounted real proﬁts, multiplied by the marginal
utility of consumption, equal to 1/Ct =1 /Yt,s ot h a tﬁrm j maximizes the



























































N o wi n s e r t( 1 1 )a n dYt = Ct into (48). Keeping only the terms where Pjt












































































































All ﬁrms j are actually in a symmetric situation, so that in equilibrium




























We ﬁrst characterize the long run equilibrium where all prices are equal





















(yt − zt) − λ(pt − pt−1)+βλ(Etpt+1 − pt)=0 (54)








































1νθ(pt − mt + zt)+αλ(1 − θ)(pt − pt−1)+αβλ(1 − θ)(pt − Etpt+1)=0
(55)
5.3 Resolution
Again we have an equation of the form:
a(pt − mt + zt)+b(pt − pt−1)+c(pt − Etpt+1)=0 (56)
with:
a = νθ b = αλ(1 − θ) c = αβλ(1 − θ) (57)
Eq. (56) is solved in the appendix, and the solution has been already
described above (eqs. 34, 35 and 36).
5.4 Competitiveness and price stickiness
Let us ﬁrst take as a benchmark the case where the cost of changing prices
is zero, i.e. where λ =0 . In that case (55) immediately yields:
pt = mt − zt = ωt (58)
Let us now consider the case λ 6=0 , and assume again the simple process
for ωt:
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (59)
Then the price is given by (appendix, eq. 81):




where φ is solution of the following characteristic equation, obtained by com-
bining (36) and (57):
Φ(φ)=αβλ(1 − θ)φ
2 − [νθ+ αλ(1 − θ)(1+β)]φ + αλ(1 − θ)=0 (61)
We can compute:









































0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (63)
We want now to see ﬁnally how the index of price stickiness φ relates to
the index of competitiveness θ.C o n s i d e r i n gﬁrst the extreme cases, we note
that φ =0if θ =1and φ =1if θ =0 .














This is negative since φ ≤ 1,a n dw et h e r e f o r eh a v ean e g a t i v er e l a t i o n
between competitiveness and price stickiness, as our intuition would tell us,
but unlike the model we considered in section 4.
6 Conclusions
We studied in this article simple dynamic models where prices are sticky
either because of staggered price contracts, or because there is a convex
cost of changing them. In these models competitiveness is measured by a
parameter θ which is higher, the higher the substitutability between goods.
Price stickiness is measured by the size of the autoregressive root φ in the
dynamic price process.
We saw that in a model with staggered price contracts (section 4)p r i c e
stickiness is, quite counterintuitively, positively related to the parameter θ
representing competitiveness. Although this is clearly disturbing, this should
not deter us from using DSGE models with sticky prices, since we saw that
in an alternative model with convex costs of changing prices (section 5)p r i c e
stickiness is, in accordance with intuition, a decreasing function of competi-
tiveness4.
4We may note that convex costs of changing prices have already been used in DSGE









































[1] Ascari, Guido (2000), “Optimising agents, staggered wages and persis-
tence in the real eﬀects of money shocks”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l ,110,
664-686.
[2] Ascari, Guido and Neil Rankin (2002), “Staggered wages and output
dynamics under disinﬂation”, Journal of Economic Economic Dynamics
and Control, 26,6 5 3 - 6 8 0 .
[3] Bénassy, Jean-Pascal (2002), The Macroeconomics of Imperfect Compe-
tition and Nonclearing Markets: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Ap-
proach, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[4] Bénassy, Jean-Pascal (2003a), “Staggered contracts and persistence: mi-
croeconomic foundations and macroeconomic dynamics”, Louvain Eco-
nomic Review, 69,1 2 5 - 1 4 4 .
[5] Bénassy, Jean-Pascal (2003b), “Output and inﬂation persistence under
price and wage staggering: analytical results”, Annales d’Economie et
de Statistique,n ◦ 69, 1-30.
[6] Calvo, Guillermo (1983), “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing
framework”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12,3 8 3 - 3 9 8 .
[7] Chari, V.V., Patrick J. Kehoe and Ellen R. McGrattan (2000), “Sticky
price models of the business cycle: can the contract multiplier solve the
persistence problem?”, Econometrica, 68, 1151-1179.
[8] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans (2001),
“Nominal rigidities and the dynamic eﬀects of a shock to monetary pol-
icy”, NBER, Cambridge, forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy.
[9] Collard, Fabrice and Guy Ertz (2000), “Stochastic nominal wage con-
tracts in a cash-in-advance model”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain,
66,2 8 1 - 3 0 1 .
[10] Hairault, Jean-Olivier and Franck Portier (1993), “Money, new-
Keynesian macroeconomics and the business cycle”, European Economic
Review, 37, 1533-1568.
[11] Huang, Kevin X.D. and Zheng Liu (2002), “Staggered price-setting,
staggered wage-setting, and business cycle persistence”, Journal of Mon-








































1[12] Jeanne, Olivier (1998), “Generating real persistent eﬀects of monetary
shocks: How much nominal rigidity do we really need?”, European Eco-
nomic Review, 42, 1009—1032.
[13] Kim, Jinill (2000), “Constructing and estimating a realistic optimizing
model of monetary policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 45,3 2 9 -
359.
[14] Lucas, Robert E. Jr (1972), “Expectations and the neutrality of money”,
Journal of Economic Theory, 4,1 0 3 - 1 2 4 .
[15] Means, Gardiner C. (1935a), “Industrial prices and their relative in-
ﬂexibility”, Senate document n◦ 13, 74th Congress, U.S. Government
Printing Oﬃce, Washington D.C.
[16] Means, Gardiner C. (1935b), “Price inﬂexibility and the requirements
of a stabilizing monetary policy”, Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 30.
[17] Rotemberg, Julio J. (1982a) “Monopolistic price adjustment and agre-
gate output”, Review of Economic Studies, 44, 517-531.
[18] Rotemberg, Julio J. (1982b) “Sticky prices in the United States”, Jour-
n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y ,90, 1187-1211.
[19] Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters (2003), “An estimated dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model of the euro area”, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 1, 1123-1175.
[20] Taylor, John B. (1979), “Staggered wage setting in a macro model”
American Economic Review, 69, 108-113.
[21] Taylor, John B. (1980), “Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts”
Journal of Political Economy, 88,1 - 2 3 .
[22] Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
[23] Yun, Tack (1996), “Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity,









































We want to solve the dynamic equation:
a(pt − mt + zt)+b(pt − pt−1)+c(pt − Etpt+1)=0 (65)
with:
a>0 b>0 c>0 (66)
Let us deﬁne the composite shock:
ωt = mt − zt (67)
We hypothesize a solution of the form:




From that we deduce:















Inserting these into the initial formula (65) we obtain:




















Identifying to zero the term in pt−1 we ﬁnd the characteristic equation
giving φ:
Φ(φ)=cφ









































1Φ(0) = b>0 Φ(1) = −a>0 (72)
so that:
0 <φ<1 (73)
Now identifying to zero the term in ωt in (70) yields:
κ0 =
a
a + b + c(1 − φ)
(74)
Finally identifying to zero the term in Etωt+j gives:
κj =
c
a + b + c(1 − φ)
κj−1 = ηκj−1 (75)












so we have indeed η<1.
We want ﬁnally to compute the solution in the particular case where
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (78)
In that case, using (74) and (75), equation (68) yields:
pt = φpt−1 +
κ0
1 − η
ωt = φpt−1 +
a
a + b − φc
ωt (79)
This, in view of (71), becomes:
pt = φpt−1 +( 1− φ)ωt (80)
which can also be rewritten:
pt = ωt −
φ
1 − φL
εt (81)
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